Climate change

This page is a sub-page of our page on Disagreement Management.

/////// Temporary formulas in Latex used for making powerpoints:

\, t_1 \, t_2 \, t_3 \,
\, h_1 \, h_2 \, h_3 \,
\, v_1 \, v_2 \, v_3 \,

\, Q \, s \, i \, \, Q \dfrac {t_1 - t_2} {t_1} \; Q \dfrac {t_2} {t_1} \, \, Q \dfrac {t_2 - t_3} {t_2} \; Q \dfrac {t_3} {t_2} \, \, s ( h_1 - h_2) + s ( h_2 - h_3) = s ( h_1 - h_3) \,

\, i ( v_1 - v_2) + i ( v_2 - v_3) = i ( v_1 - v_3) \, .

Related KMR-pages:

• Physics and its Models
Entropy
The Decadence of Work, by Theodor Svedberg, 1915 (translated from Swedish)
Social Algebra
Social Calculus
Modeling and Mapping
Knowledge Negotiations
David Hestenes on Modeling
Provocative Modeling

Other relevant sources of information:

Perspektiv på luftens koldioxidhalt

Uncertainty in science and its role in climate policy, by Leonard A. Smith and Nicholas Stern, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, A(2011) 369, 4818-4841, doi:10.1098/rsta.2011.0149

Seeing through complexity: conflict, ideological change, environment and energy, innovation, new economics, societal growth and crisis, by Thomas Homer-Dixon.

The Upside of Down – Catastrophy, Creativity, and the Renewal of Civilization by Thomas Homer-Dixon, review by Jennifer M. Rohleder, Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Vol. 7, Issue 2, Winter 2007.

Complexity Science, by Thomas Homer-Dixon, Oxford leadership Journal, January 2011, Volume 2, Issue 1.

• Panarchy: Theory and Application, by Craig R. Allen, David G. Angeler, Ahjond S. Garmestani, Lance H. Gunderson, and C. S. Holling, the DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska – Lincoln.

Synchronous failure: the emerging causal architecture of global crisis, by Thomas Homer-Dixon, Brian Walker, Reinette Biggs, Anne-Sophie Crépin, Carl Folke, Eric F. Lambin, Garry D. Peterson, Johan Rockström, Marten Scheffer, Will Steffen and Max Troell,
Ecology and Society 20(3):6, 2015.

• Human and nature dynamics (HANDY): Modeling inequality and use of resources in the collapse or sustainability of societies, by Safa Motesharrei, Jorge Rivas, Eugenia Kalnay, in Ecological Economics 101(2014), pp.90–102.

Environmental Law Commons

Discrepancy in scientific authority and media visibility of climate change scientists and contrarians, Petersen, M., Vincent, E.M., Westerling, A.L., NATURE COMMUNICATIONS|(2019)10:3502.

Changing Climate, Changing Minds, Guest post by David Siegel on WUWT, 14 March, 2020.

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Anchors into the text below:
Debattklimatet i klimatdebatten
• The debate climate of the climate debate

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What follows is an embryo of a
Knowledge Base for a TYPOLOGY OF CLIMATE DEBATERS

Scientists:

Satellite bulk tropospheric temperatures as a metric for climate sensitivity,
by John R. Christy and Richard T. McNider, Springer Link, 29 November 2017.

Roy Spencer’s home page.

Weak El Nino Conditions Help Explain Recent Global Warmth,
by Roy Spencer, January 13, 2020.

1D Model of Global SST Shows 40% of Warming Since 1979 Due to Early Volcanic Cooling,
by Roy Spencer, January 14, 2020.

• UAH Global Temperature Update for February 2020: +0.76 deg. C,
by Roy Spencer, 2 March 2020.

Balloons in the Air: Understanding weather and climate, by Dr. Ronan Connolly & Dr. Michael Connolly, Center for Environmental Research and Earth Sciences, 16 Aug 2019.

So if Angstrom already proved Arrhenius wrong, then what’s the problem?
at ClimateDebate.com

Explainer: How do scientists measure global temperature, at www.carbonbrief.org, 2015.

Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide – March 2019 – March 2020,
by Global Monitoring Laboratory, Earth System Research Laboratories, March 2020.
[Kan bli intressant för att belysa den alternativa hypotesen som säger att CO2 framförallt drivs av naturliga variationer i jordens klimat. T.ex. data från iskärnor som rätt konsekvent visar att uppvärmning kommer före ökad halt av CO2.]

Presentation Prof. Murry Salby in Hamburg on 18 April 2013.

In Swedish:

• Falskt Alarm – Klimatfrågan ur vetenskaplig aspekt, på falsktalarm.se

• Ladda ner boken Falskt Alarm – Klimatfrågan ur vetenskaplig aspekt, av Gösta Pettersson, professor emeritus i biokemi vid Lunds Universitet.

Falskt alarm om Falskt Alarm om Klimatet, kritik av boken Falskt Alarm av Maths Nilsson, författare.

• Gösta Pettersson svarar på kritiken från Maths Nilsson.

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Journalists:

In Swedish:

Forskare nyanserar domedagsprofetian, av Gunnar Wetterberg, Expressen, 26 jan 2020.

Back to English:

Activists:

Alarmists:

IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

‘The only uncertainty is how long we’ll last’: a worst case scenario for the climate in 2050, by Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac, 15 Febr 2020, the Guardian.

Greta Thunberg’s speech at the Davos Meeting 2020.

Climate Strikers: Open Letter to EU Leaders on why their new climate law is ‘surrender, 3 March 2020.

• Debunking Tony Heller’s ‘Gift to Climate Alarmists’, Mallen Baker on YouTube, 1 Oct 2019.

Response to Tony Heller’s Why Climate Science is Broken, Mallen Baker on YouTube 12 Nov 2019.

Silence the YouTube climate skeptics! | The Mallen Baker Show on YouTube, 17 Jan 2020.

In Swedish:

Slutrapport_Bortom BNP, Göran Finnveden m.fl., KTH/Arkitektur, 29 dec 2019.

Vad har hänt med den akademiska miljön?, av Per Welander, 17 jan 2020, Klimatupplysningen.se

In English:

Skeptics:

NIPCC (Non-governmental International Panel on Climate Change)

Fact Checking The Claim Of 97% Consensus On Anthropogenic Climate Change,
by Earl J. Richie, Forbes, 14 Dec 2016.

The In-depth Story Behind a Climate Fraud, John Robson on YouTube,
Climate Discussion Nexus, 9 May 2019

Hide The Decline: A Climategate Backgrounder, John Robson on YouTube,
Climate Discussion Nexus, 6 Dec 2019.

In Swedish:

Klimatrealisterna – för en genomtänkt klimatpolitik,
Klimatupplysningen.se

Kända politiker som är klimathotsskeptiker – del 1, av Per Welander, 3 jan 2020,
Klimatupplysningen.se

Kända politiker som är klimathotsskeptiker – del 2, av Per Welander, 9 jan 2020,
Klimatupplysningen.se

Klimatkarusellen, vilka frågor kan besvaras?, av Elsa Widding, 9 maj 2019,
Klimatupplysningen.se

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Debattklimatet i klimatdebatten: av Elsa Widding och Ingeman Arbnor

Klimatdebattörstyper Karaktäriseras av Drivna av / Utgörs av
1.
Klimatextemister
Klimatextremisterna
tolkar all klimatinformation
apokalyptiskt.
Okunnighet, rädsla,
medvetna eller omedvetna syften
som gynnar personen eller
organisationen ifråga.
2.
Klimatalarmister
Klimatalarmisterna
utgörs av personer
eller organisationer
som ofta, för egen räkning,
har allt att vinna på
en alarmerande klimatdebatt.

Alla som inte
bejakar deras extremism
beskrivs som klimatförnekare
eftersom de förnekar
att världen står inför
en ohejdbar katastrof.

Att nå målen
för Parisavtalet
anses
inom den här gruppen
som självklart
och helt nödvändigt,
liksom att utföra
symbolhandlingar
av olika slag, som t.ex.
att äta mindre oxött,
att blanda etanol eller palmolja
i bilbränslet, att äga en elbil
eller att flyga mindre.

Ofta utnyttjar
klimatalarmisterna
kimatextremisterna
som “murbräcka”
för sina egna syften.

Denna grupp har ofta
en oärlig agenda
och består
både av okunniga
och mer kunniga
personer.

Bland de okunniga
syns ofta politiker
och bland de mer kunniga
även forskare,
som har allt att vinna
på en uppskruvad debatt
eftersom detta
kan leda till
ökade forskningsanslag.

3.
Klimatidealister
Klimatidealisterna
läser rapporterna från IPCC
helt okritiskt,
som den bästa
vetenskapliga sanning
som vi har tillgång till.

Väljer att tolka alla osäkra data
värsta tänkbara sätt
inom de felgränser
som IPCC anger.

Inte sällan väljer man
att beskriva konsekvenserna
av klimatförändringarna
baserat på de värsta tänkbara
modellscenarierna också,
så man använder inte sällan
RCP 8,5.

Klimatidealisterna
kan vara väl pålästa
och agerar därför
inte extremistiskt
eller alarmistiskt,
men man hänvisar ofta
till de beräkningar
som IPCC utfört
och till vad som anses
nödvändigt att göra
för att reducera
de globala nettoutsläppen.

Klimatidealisterna
ställer sig bakom
klimatlagen.

4.
Klimatrealister
Klimatrealisterna
läser rapporterna från IPCC
som den bästa
vetenskapliga sanning
som vi har tillgång till idag,
men väljer att sätta sin tillit till
IPCCs mest sannolika data
– varken uppåt eller nedåt.

Parisavtalets mål,
att hålla temeraturökingen
inom 1,5 grader,
anser man är ogenomförbart
eftersom det skulle innebära
att man omedelbart
skulle behöva
upphöra med all användning
av fossila bränslen,
vilket skulle innebära
en ekonomisk katastrof
för den fattiga världen.

1,5 gradersmålet
är kort och gott idiotiskt

tycker den här gruppen.

Problemet
med en ökande halt
av växtusgaser i atmosfären
anses vara
ett lösbart problem
över tid.

Globalt råder ju inte heller
termisk jämvikt,
eftersom atmosfären
är varmare än haven,
och havens temperatur
kommer därför att stiga
och avge koldioxid
några decennier framåt.

Dessutom
är det bara 0,3 grader kvar
till 1,5 graders målet,
och detta mål
är  0,15 grader närmare nu
än man trodde i AR5.

Klimatrealisterna
vänder sig mot
panikåtgärder
och förordar istället
en plan
som bygger på
bästa vetenskap
och på  vad som är ekonomiskt
och socialt acceptabelt.

Man anser dessutom
att människan är fullt kapabel
att klara en temperaturhöjning
på 1 grad.

Klimatlagen är orimlig
och bör avskaffas.

 5.
Klimatrationalister
Klimatrationalisterna
väljer att tolka
alla osäkra data från IPCC
mildast  tänkbara sätt
inom de felgränser
som IPCC anger.

IPCCs nonchalans bidrar
enligt klimatrationalisterna
till en ännu större osäkerhet
än vad som reflekteras
i de modellscenarier
som IPCC presenterar.

Klimatmodellernas
projektioner
kan därför
inte tolkas som
förutsägelser

om en avlägsen framtid,
utan måste
ses som
varninar
för att obekymrat
elda upp fossila reserver
i närtid.

Parisavtalets mål
anses ligga långt under
en eventuellt problematisk
temperaturhöjning.

Klimatrationalister
är normalt
mycket kunniga
och inte sällan
professor emeritus
med expertkunskaper
inom klimatfrågans
grundvetenskaper.

6.
Klimatindifferenter
=
Klimatexploatörer
Klimatindifferenterna
bryr sig inte om IPCC
men anammar den politiska retoriken
om att vi befinner oss
i en klimatkris,
dvs man accepterar
den politiska viljan
att Sverige ska bli fossilfritt
och leva upp till målen
i Parisavtalet
utan att närmare fundera
över konsekvenserna.
I gruppen av
klimatindifferenter
finns det väldigt många
som passar in.

Den här gruppen
drivs ofta av
egna intressen
– ofta affärsmässiga.

Klimatindifferenterna
saknar dock
egna kunskaper
och ett eget engagemang
i själva klimatfrågan.

Så en annan
lämplig benämning
på denna grupp
skulle kunna vara
klimatexploatörer.

Här skulle t.ex. Vattenfall
kunna passa in,
och många
branchorganisationer
,
liksom även många
vindkraftsexploatörer
.

Det handlar till stor del
om pengar,
och om att vara
politiskt korrekt,
genom att passa in
i den expanderande 
hållbarhetsgruppen
.

7.
Klimatignoranter
Klimatignoranterna
avfärdar klimatdebatten
med att IPCC
har fått det mesta om bakfoten,
och att den forskning
som IPCC väljer ut
för sin sammanställning
av kunskapsläget
till stora delar
handlar om politik.

Det finns en skepsis
till koldioxidens betydelse
för temperaturen
och ibland även
till växthuseffekten.

Klimatignoranterna
har ofta egna bloggar,
där det argumenteras för
att uppvärmningen
av atmosfären
inte alls påverkas
av dess koldoixidhalt,
utan har helt andra orsaker.

Klimatignoranterna
bevisar ofta
att de har rätt
med argument
som andra experter anser
är uppenbart
fysikaliskt felaktiga.

Så här finns
en väldigt intensiv debatt.

De tre första grupperna (klimatextremisterna, klimatalarmisterna och klimatidealisterna) går ut väldigt hårt i mainstream media, dvs SR, SVT och de stora dagstidningarna, med starkt stöd av journalistkåren i Sverige. Dom agerar för att få politiken att så snabbt som möjligt genomföra den här stora klimatomställningen, vanligtvis tyvärr utan någon som helst form av konsekvenstänkande.

Sedan har vi klimatrealisterna och klimatrationalisterna som argumentar för att andra problem i samhället är viktigare än att snabbt försöka minska utsläppen av koldioxid i atmosfären, eftersom klimatet inte förändras i den snabba takt som de tre första grupperna anser. De konsekvenser av klimatförändringarna som diskuteras i media har normalt inte någon koppling till den ökande halten av koldioxid i atmosfären, utan man diskuterar en massa saker som egentligen är ganska ovidkommande.

Klimatrealisterna och klimatrationalisterna anser att vi bör prioritera världens resurser på ett bättre och mer kostnads- och klimateffektivt sätt och fokusera på det som är viktigare för mänskligheten än att på kort sikt minska fossilberoendet. Inom de här två grupperna refererar man ofta till data från det stora vetenskapliga arbetet på flera tusen sidor som IPCC sammanställer, AR6 alltså. Och det är inom de här två grupperna som det pågår en vetenskapsbaserad kritik av både IPCC och den politiserade klimatdebatten som sådan.

Klimatindifferenterna funderar inte på vad som är rätt eller fel i den vetenskapliga diskussionen runt klimatet – det kanske är för svårt för dem, eller för jobbigt, eller också så saknar man bara intresse och det rätta engagemanget – och inte sällan så väljer man att anamma det synsätt som är mest politiskt korrekt och mest gynnsamt för den privata karriärsutvecklingen. Eller så struntar man helt i ämnet, liksom i att delta i någon form av klimatdebatt överhuvudtaget.

Och sist, klimatignoranterna, som anser att själva den vetenskapliga grunden för klimatdebatten är felaktig. Man kritiserar inte bara diverse antaganden som IPCC gör utan anser att hela IPCC närmast är att likna vid en bluff.

///////

SD: Ohållbar situation för energisystemet, Svenska Dagbladet, 13 Juni 2022.

Varför jag väljer politiken, av Elsa Widding på YouTube, 1 Maj 2022.

Står vi inför en global lågkonjunktur?, Magnus Henrekson och Jan Blomgren intervievas av Marco Strömberg på Hotspot, 12 Mars 2022.

Så blev Sverige en koloni för energi, Jan Blomgren på Ledarsidorna.se, 6 Juli 2022.

Är Sverige en koloni för energi?, Elsa Widding #63 på Klimatkarusellen , 8 Juli 2022.

Vad kostar vindkraften – egentligen?, Jan Blomgren på Ledarsidorna.se, 9 Juli 2022

VIND-LÖGNER: Vindkraftens Verkliga Kostnader, Henrik Jönsson på YouTube, 9 Juli 2022.

Stoppa slöseriet på helt orealistiska projekt, Björn Törnvall på Ledarsidorna.se, 1 Juli 2022.

Nu anmäler jag SVT, av Elsa Widding på YouTube, 30 Oct 2021
Transcribed into English.

Klimatkarusellen: Elsa Widdings kanal på YouTube, april 2020.

Högt spel i Davos, av Jacob Nordangård, 4 febr 2020,
Klimatupplysningen.se

Halvseriöst om klimatet, av Gunnar Carlsson på Acta Catastrophica

In English:

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The debate climate of the climate debate: (in Swedish) by Elsa Widding and Ingeman Arbnor

Debating types Characterised by Driven by / Consist of
1.
Climate
extemists
Climate extemists
interpret all climate information
apocalyptically.
Ignorance, fear,
conscious or unconscious forces
that benefit the person or
organisation in question.
2.
Climate
alarmists
Climate alarmists
are persons or organizations
that often have everything to gain
from an alarming climate debate.
Everybody who does not
accept their extremism
is described as
a “climate denialist”
since s/he denies
that the world is facing
an unavoidable catastrophy.

Within this group
it is considered
as self-evident
and absolutely necessary
to achieve the goals
of the Paris agreement
as well as to carry out
symbolic acts
of different kinds,
as for instance
to eat less red meat,
to mix ethanol or palm oil
into the car fuel,
to own an electric car
or to fly less.

The climate alarmists
often make use of
the climate extremists
as “proxies”
for their own purposes.

This group often has
a dishonest agenda
and consists of
both ignorant
and more knowledgable
people.

Among the ignorant
one often finds politicians.

Among the more knowledgable
one often finds researchers,
that have everything to gain
from a heated debate,
since this can lead to
increased funding
for their own research.

3.
Climate
idealists
Climate idealists
read the reports from the IPCC
in a totally uncritical way,
as the best scientific truth
that we have available.

Climate idealists
choose to interpret
all uncertain data
in the worst possible way
within the error boundaries
that the IPCC provides.

Climate idealists
often choose to interpret
the consequences
of climate change
based on the worst possible
model scenarios
that the IPCC provides,
so they often make use of
RCP 8,5.

Climate idealists
can be well informed
and therefore
they don’t act extremistically
or alarmistically,
but they often refer to
the calculations
that the IPCC has carried out
and to what is considered necessary
in order to reduce
the global netto emissions.

Climate idealists
accept the
The Swedish Climate Law.

4.
Climate
realists
Climate realists
read the reports from the IPCC
as the best scientific truth
that we have at our disposal
today,
but they choose to rely on
the most probable data
that the IPCC provides
– neither uppward or downward
in probability.

The aim of the Paris agreement,
to keep the temperature increase
of the atmosphere
within 1.5 degrees Centigrade,
is considered to be impossible
since it would mean
to immediately
cease to make use
of all types of fossile fuels,
which would lead to
an economic disaster
for the poor countries
in the world.

The 1.5 degree goal
of the Paris agreement
is simply lunatic

according to this group.

The problem
with an increasing amount
of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere
is considered to be solvable
over time.

Globally there is no
thermodynamic equilibrium,
since the atmosphere
is warmer that the oceans.

Therefore the temperature
of the oceans
will rise, and the oceans
will emit carbon dioxide
during several decennia ahead.

Moreover
there is only 0.3 degrees left
until we reach the 1.5 degrees goal,
and this goal
is presently  0.15 degrees closer
that what was thought in AR5.

Climate realists
are against panic measures
and instead
they propose a plan
based on the most reliable scientific facts
as well as on what is economically
and socially acceptable.

Climate realists also consider
human beings to be fully capable
of coping with a raise of temperature
of one degree Centigrade.

The Swedish Climate Law
is considered to be unreasonable

and should be abolished.

 5.
Climate
rationalists
Climate rationalists
choose to interpret
all uncertain data from the IPCC
in the most beneficial way
within the error boundaries
that the IPCC provides.

According to the climate rationalists,
the nonchalance of the IPCC
contributes to
an even greater uncertainty
that what is reflected
in the model scenarios
that the IPCC presents.

The projections
of the climate models
should therefore
not be interpreted
as predictions
about a distant future ,
but should instead
be interpreted as
as warnings against
the light-hearted burning
of fossile reserves
in the near future.

The aims of the Paris agreement
regarding temperature
are considered to be
far below
a potentially problematic raise.

Climate rationalists
are normally very knowledgable
and often professor emeritus
with expert knowledge
within the basic sciences
that underlie the climate question.

6.
Climate
indifferents

=
Climate
exploiters
Climate indifferents
do not care about the IPCC
but align themselves
with the political rhetoric
that we are in a climate crisis,
that is, they accept
the political will
that Sweden should become
fossile-free
and should live up to
the aims of the
Paris agreement
without thinking through
the consequences.
In the group of
climate indifferents
there are very many that fit in well.

The members of this group
are often driven by personal interests
normally business interests.

However,
climate indifferents
most often lack personal knowledge
as well as personal engagement
regarding the climate question as such.

So another suitable label
for this group could be
climate exploiters.

The Swedish electricity provider
Vattenfall 
probably belongs to this group,
as do many
branch organisations
,
as well as many
windpower exploiters
.

The climate indifferents
are essentially about money,
and about being politically correct,
by pledging allegiance to
the rapidly expanding 
sustainability group
.

7.
Climate
ignorants
Climate ignorants
dismiss the  climate debate
by claiming that the IPCC
has got most things wrong,
and that the research
that the IPCC selects
for its presentations
of the knowledge state
of climate research
in most parts
is based on poitics.

There is a skeptic attitude
regarding the importance
of carbon dioxide
for the temperature
of the atmosphere
and sometimes even
with regard to
the greenhouse effect itself.

Climate ignorants
often have their own blogs,
where they argue
that the warming
of the atmosphere
is not caused by
its increase of carbon dioxide
but has entirely different causes.

Climate ignorants
often prove
that they are right
by bringing forth arguments
that other experts
consider obviously wrong
for physical reasons.

So here there is
a very intense debate
going on.

The first three groups (Climate extremists, Climate alarmists and Climate idealists) are heavily present in mainstream media, that is Swedish Radio, Swedish Television and the major daily newspapers, with strong support from the Swedish journalists. Their aim is to get politics to carry out the “green energy transformation” as soon as possible, usually without any kind of critical thinking about the consequences, unfortunately.

The we have the climate realists and the climate rationalists that argue that other problems in society are more important than trying to diminish the emission of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere as fast as possible, since the climate is not changing as fast as the first three groups claim. The consequences of climate change that are discussed in mainstream media normally has no connection to the increasing amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and the journalists are discussing a lot of issues, that in fact are rather irrelevant.

The climate realists and the climate rationalists  think that we should prioritize the world’s resources in a better and more cost- and climate-effective way. We should focus on that which is more important for humanity that a super-rapid diminishing of our dependence on fossile fuel. Within these two groups one often refers to data from the large scientific study of several thousand pages that is orchestrated by the IPCC that is , AR6. And it is within these two groups that the scientific critisism of both IPCC and the highly politicised debate can be found.

The climate indifferents  are not thinking about what is correct respectively incorrect in the scientific discussion of climate change. This may be because this may be too difficult for them, or it may be because the people in this group simply lack the interest and the proper engagement. Instead they choose to adopt the opinions that are most politically correct and therefore most beneficial for  the development of their personal careers. Or they simply choose to ignore the subject and not  take part in the climate debate at all.

And finally, the climate ignorants, claim that the scientifc basis for the climate debate is incorrect. People in this group critizise not only some of the assumptions made by the  IPCC but consider the IPCC itself to be somewhat of a scam.

///////

Maldives To Drown Again, Pulling Back The Curtain on Junk Science,
by Tony Heller, 17 Jan 2020.

Arctic Sea Ice Refuses To Melt As Ordered, by Tony Heller, on YouTube, 30 Jan 2020.

Real Climate Science, Tony Heller’s blog.

A Century of US Cooling – Erased by NOAA, by Tony Heller on YouTube, 20 Dec 2017.

Climate.etc, by Judith Curry.

The toxic rhetoric of climate change, by Judith Curry, December 14, 2019.

A Climate Blacklist That Works: “It Should Make Her Unhirable In Academia”,
by Roger Pielke at Forbes.com 9 Febr 2020.

Denialists:

Climate Change with Lord Monckton, YouTube August 9, 2018.

Viscount Christopher Monckton Speech – Climate Change: Debunking the Myths, YouTube October 9, 2019.

Global warming on trial and the elementary error of physics that caused the global warming scare by Christopher Monckton of Brenchley, March 19, 2018.

Roy Spencer’s response to Lord Mochton’s article, March 22, 2018.

Lord Monchton’s response to Roy Spencer’s response, March 23, 2018.

///////

In Swedish:

Typologi (= ontologi) av av klimatdebattörer (version 1):

Klimatdebattörer

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In English:

The Climate Debate: Disagreement Management Through Knowledge Algebra:

Knowledge algebra is a matrix-based mathematical framework that enables dynamic overview of the model that you are developing (or executing) as well as combinatorial control over the options from which the successive choices are made.

Modeling in KA consists of constructing knowlecules, which represent separate chunks or ‘molecules’ of encoded knowledge or behaviour. A knowlecule is a type of matrix (specifically a named adjacency matrix). The thing whose name or description appears in the position \, [i, k] \, of this matrix indicates that there is a relationship between the things whose names appear in row \, i \, and column \, k .

Being matrices, knowlecules can be combined in various ways according to the rules of matrix algebra. Since the things behind the names can be anything, anything that can be named can be modeled. This includes all chains of (possibly) relevant relations between all parameters that have been introduced in the model. Moreover, such relational chains can be evaluated both contextually and symbolically, allowing each symbol of a formal computation to change its relevance dynamically – by being connected to context-specific evaluations that bring in dynamic information from the outside. This feature of emerging relevance is at the heart of knowledge algebra. A good illustration of the power of this way of modeling is provided by the Ericsson AXE10 delay.

Business algebra is an application of knowledge algebra to the business domain. Business algebra was developed within the EU/IST/FP7 project TELL ME, and is described in detail in the report Business Algebra: A Mathematical Framework for Business Process Modeling,
[TELL ME D.1.3-Annex(v2)].

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How actors influence each other through their models, reports and summaries
(work in progress):

Actors –> processes –> Products:

\, \langle \, A_{ctors} \, \vert \, \vert \, P_{roducts} \, \rangle \, =
  PRODUCTS \rightarrow
ACTORS \, \downarrow \,
models reports summaries
scientists scientists modeling scientists reporting scientists summarizing
technologists  technologists modeling  technologists reporting  technologists summarizing
investorists  investorists modeling  investorists reporting  investorists summarizing
economists economists modeling economists reporting economists summarizing
politicists politicists modeling politicists reporting politicists summarizing
journalists journalists modeling journalists reporting journalists summarizing
activists activists modeling activists reporting activists summarizing

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Products –> influence –> Actors (work in progress):

\, \langle \, P_{roducts} \, \vert \, \vert \, A_{ctors} \, \rangle \, =
  ACTORS \rightarrow
PRODUCTS \, \downarrow \,
scien-
tists
 technolo-
gists
 investo-
rists
econo-
mists
politi-
cists
journa-
lists
acti-
vists
models  models
influence
 models
influence
 models
influence
 models
influence
 models
influence
 models
influence
 models
influence
reports  reports
influence
 reports
influence
 reports
influence
 reports
influence
 reports
influence
 reports
influence
 reports
influence
summaries  sums
influence
 sums
influence
 sums
influence
 sums
influence
 sums
influence
 sums
influence
 sums
influence

///////

Actors –> influence –> Actors (work in progress):

\, \langle \, A_{ctors} \, \vert \, \vert \, P_{roducts} \, \rangle \, \times \, \langle \, P_{roducts} \, \vert \, \vert \, A_{ctors} \, \rangle \, = \, \langle \, A_{ctors} \, \vert \, \vert \, A_{ctors} \, \rangle \, =
  ACTORS \rightarrow
ACTORS \, \downarrow \,
scien-
tists
 technolo-
gists
 investo-
rists
econo-
mists
politi-
cists
journa-
lists
acti-
vists
 scientists  scientists
influence
 scientists
influence
 scientists
influence
 scientists
influence
 scientists
influence
 scientists
influence
 scientists
influence
 technologists techies
influence
techies
influence
techies
influence
techies
influence
techies
influence
techies
influence
techies
influence
investorists  investies
influence
 investies
influence
 investies
influence
 investies
influence
 investies
influence
 investies
influence
 investies
influence
economists  economs
influence
 economs
influence
 economs
influence
 economs
influence
 economs
influence
 economs
influence
 economs
influence
politicists  politicos
influence
 politicos
influence
 politicos
influence
 politicos
influence
 politicos
influence
 politicos
influence
 politicos
influence
journalists  writers
influence
 writers
influence
 writers
influence
 writers
influence
 writers
influence
 writers
influence
 writers
influence
activists  activists
influence
 activists
influence
 activists
influence
 activists
influence
 activists
influence
 activists
influence
 activists
influence

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Actors --> produce --> Products --> influence --> Actors(6)
Actors --> influence --> Actors(5)

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Refining the ‘activist’ type by introducing ‘alarmist’, ‘scepticist’, and ‘denialist’ (work in progress):

Actors --> produce --> Products --> influence --> Actors(7)

Refining the activist actor into alarmist, scepticist and denialist(4)

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Peter Senge on Global Climate Change:

Global Climate Change 1:
Global Climate Change 1

Global Climate Change 2:
Global Climate Change 2

Global Climate Change 3:
Global Climate Change 3

Source: The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization,
by Peter Senge (2006(1990), p. 345), ISBN 0-385-51725-4.

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DISAGREEMENT MAP ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(work in progress):

Conzilla original: http://conzilla.org/users/amb/project/disagreementManagement/layout/contextmap#547d566417366c8149f

Some screendumps:

Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics (v4)
Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics (v4)

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Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics
CLINTEL = Climate Intelligence:
Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics (CLINTEL)

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Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics
The CLINTEL scientific manifesto:
Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics (the CLINTEL scientific manifesto)

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Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics
CLINTEL: there is no climate emergency:
Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics (CLINTEL there is no climate emergency)

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Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics
CLINTEL: open letter to the KNAW – part 1:
Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics (CLINTEL open letter to the KNAW - part 1)

Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics
CLINTEL: open letter to the KNAW – part 2:
Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics (CLINTEL open letter to the KNAW - part 2)

Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics
CLINTEL open letter to the KNAW – part 3:
Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics (CLINTEL open letter to the KNAW - part 3)

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CLINTEL deniers
Climate Science Deniers Planning European Misinformation Campaign:
CLINTEL deniers (Climate Science Deniers Planning European Misinformation Campaign)

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CLINTEL deniers
Letter signed by “500 scientists” relies on inaccurate claims about climate science:
CLINTEL deniers (Letter signed by “500 scientists” relies on inaccurate claims about climate science)

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CLINTEL deniers
DESMOG: Clearing the PR Pollution that clouds climate:
CLINTEL deniers (DESMOG - Clearing the PR Pollution that clouds climate)

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Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics
Connolly and Connolly: Balloons in the air – Understanding Weather and Climate (YouTube):
Climate Alarmists, Researchers, Skeptics (Connolly and connolly - Ballons in the air)

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Professor Valentina Zharkova
CONFIRMS “super” grand solar minimum (on Youtube):
Valentina Zharkova at the Global Warming Policy Foundation in October 2018 (on Youtube)

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Valentina Zharkova’s Double Dynamo
Double layers in the turbulent surface layer of the Sun:
Zharkova’s double layers in the turbulent surface layer of the Sun (Double Dynamo)

Dipole potential surface
(Math Rehab on YouTube):

The Latest on the Double-Dynamo Solar Model
and Dr. Zharkova’s Predictions of a Grand Minimum:
The Latest on the Double-Dynamo Solar Model, and Dr. Zharkova’s Predictions of a Grand Minimum

Quadrupole potential surface
(Math Rehab on YouTube):

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/////// Quoting Smith and Stern: Uncertainty in science and its role in climate policy

Abstract:

Policy-making is usually about risk management. Thus, the handling of uncertainty in science is central to its support of sound policy-making. There is value in scientists engaging in a deep conversation with policy-makers and others, not merely ‘delivering’ results or analyses and then playing no further role. Communicating the policy relevance of different varieties of uncertainty, including imprecision, ambiguity, intractability and indeterminism, is an important part of this conversation. Uncertainty is handled better when scientists engage with policy-makers.

Climate policy aims both to alter future risks (particularly via mitigation) and to take account of and respond to relevant remaining risks (via adaptation) in the complex causal chain that begins and ends with individuals. Policy-making profits from learning how to shift the distribution of risks towards less dangerous impacts, even if the probability of events remains uncertain. Immediate value lies not only in communicating how risks may change with time and how those risks may be changed by action, but also in projecting how our understanding of those risks may improve with time (via science) and how our ability to influence them may advance (via technology and policy design).

Guidance on the most urgent places to gather information and realistic estimates of when to expect more informative answers is of immediate value, as are plausible estimates of the risk of delaying action. Risk assessment requires grappling with probability and ambiguity (uncertainty in the Knightian sense) and assessing the ethical, logical, philosophical and economic underpinnings of whether a target of ‘50 per cent chance of remaining under +2◦C’ is either ‘right’ or ‘safe’. How do we better stimulate advances in the difficult analytical and philosophical questions while maintaining foundational scientific work advancing our understanding of the phenomena? And provide immediate help with decisions that must be made now?

1. Introduction

[…]

Writing in 1921, Knight [3] noted that economics ‘is the only one of the social sciences which has aspired to the distinction of an exact science . . . it secures a moderate degree of exactness only at the cost of much greater unreality’. A similar competition between exactness and unreality is present in climate science, where differences between our models of the world and the world itself lead to situations where we cannot usefully place probabilities on outcomes (ambiguity) alongside situations where we can place probabilities on outcomes (imprecision) even if we cannot determine the outcome precisely.

Specific scientific details in the ‘unreality’ of current climate models led Held [4] to note that in the future ‘today’s global warming simulations will be of historical interest only’. This statement itself may be of value to policy-making by stifling overconfidence in the details of today’s model output. It does not imply that climate science is of no value in supporting climate policy today, as climate science provides a basis for risk management much deeper and firmer than the latest simulation model. Models can increase our understanding long before they start providing realistic numbers. Sound policy- making can profit from a clear and lively discussion of what we know, what we do not know and what we are likely to soon know significantly better than we know now.

The fact that uncertainties are large cannot be taken to imply that the risks are small, or that policy-makers can act as if the risks were small. Both the magnitude of plausible impacts and the cost of delayed action figure into the risk-management framework, making the claim ‘uncertainty in the future climate justifies acting as if the risks were small’ completely untenable. Uncertainty in the face of plausible risks can be argued to support immediate action. In a risk-management framework, scientists propose both the physical mechanisms supporting a view and an estimate of the probability that that view is, in fact, incorrect; ideally suggesting some decisive observations to distinguish their position from the alternatives [5]. Focusing applied scientific research on the reduction of risk and public debate on the point at which current science enters ambiguity sidesteps an endless discussion of establishing certainty. In any case, certainty is not on offer for the particular applications being discussed here. Arguably, certainty is an aim even well beyond the goals of science.

[…]

2. Distinguishing some varieties of uncertainty

Writing in 1862 about the provision of information regarding the likely weather, FitzRoy [6] stressed, ‘When in doubt, distrusting indications, or inferences from them, the words “Uncertain”, or “Doubtful”, may be used, without hesitation’ (italics in the original). While doubt remains the active state of the working scientist, the public communication of the scepticism scientists hold regarding various details of the science of the day is often surprisingly constrained and confused. In part, this comes from different scientists using common words to mean very different things. Policy-making is often focused on cases where there is confidence that major changes are likely to occur, while there is very limited ability to quantify the impacts of those changes for people. There are at least four relevant varieties of uncertainty in this case (see also Granger-Morgan et al. [7], Petersen [8] and Berliner [9] and references therein), and they are not mutually exclusive: imprecision, ambiguity, intractability and indeterminacy.

Imprecision (Knightian risk, conditional probability): related to outcomes which we do not know precisely, but for which we believe robust, decision- relevant probability statements can be provided. This is also called ‘statistical uncertainty’ [10–12].

Ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty): related to outcomes (be they known, unknown or disputed), for which we are not in a position to make probability statements.1 Elsewhere called ‘recognized ignorance’ [11,12] and ‘scenario uncertainty’ [10]. Ambiguity sometimes reflects uncertainty in an estimated probability, and is then referred to as ‘second-order uncertainty’.

Intractability: related to computations known to be relevant to an outcome, but lying beyond the current mathematical or computational capacity to formulate or to execute faithfully; also to situations where we are unable to formulate the relevant computations.

Indeterminacy: related to quantities relevant to policy-making for which no precise value exists. This applies, for instance, with respect to a model parameter that does not correspond to an actual physical quantity. It can also arise from the honest diversity of views among people, regarding the desirability of obtaining or avoiding a given outcome. Noting indeterminacy reminds us of the difference between a situation where no fact of the matter exists from the case in which there is a fact of the matter but it is not known precisely.

[…]

3. The causal chain and sound climate policy

[…]

The perceived risks to individuals in the present and the future drive current policy to design and deploy changes to the emission pathway, changes which aim for a more desirable outcome for individuals and societies. Poor handling of uncertainty by science can lead to less effective policy-making. Specifically, encouraging overconfidence in the realism of today’s best available simulation or intentionally portraying ambiguity incorrectly as if it was imprecision could lead to undesirable outcomes for individuals and societies, outcomes which could have been avoided by better-informed policy-making today.

Alternatively, scientific reflection aided by a realistic analysis of model output can indicate which actions are most likely to reduce the likelihood of undesirable events even amidst imprecision, ambiguity, intractability and indeterminacy. Improving the manner in which science handles uncertainty can aid policy-making in its attempt to shift unspecified ‘probability distributions’ towards more acceptable outcomes.

It is weather that impacts individuals. Early definitions of ‘climate’ recognize this; climate reflects the impacts on individuals when it is considered to be the statistical collective of weather however expressed [25]. Under this definition, changes in climate are of direct policy relevance. Modern definitions of climate tend to discuss average weather, say monthly means, and how these average values change in time [26]. Defined in this way, climate does not translate into impacts: in particular, short-lived extreme events [27] are excluded by the definition. This is a result of the simple fact that weather defines the climate, whereas climate, if defined as averages, does not define the weather. And it is weather that impacts individuals.

[…]

6. Ambiguity and insight in science

The knowledge base in climate science is much deeper than the latest, most complicated climate model, even if the headlines perpetually focus on the latest model runs. The science base as a whole suggests that the risks of significant impacts of increasing greenhouse gas concentrations are large. There are many models, and the latest model takes its place in this hierarchy [4,36,37]. Thus far, each level of the hierarchy confirms that the risk of significant negative impacts is large. Detailed impacts are not certain, but this uncertainty does not suggest a scientific argument that the risks are small. Incorporating scientific uncertainty into policy can reduce negative impacts due either to an ignorance of uncertainty or to the misuse of a good knowledge of uncertainty.

In an early paper on simulating the effect of doubling the concentration of carbon dioxide in a climate model, Manabe & Wetheral [38] noted that ‘because of the various simplifications of the model described above, it is not advisable to take too seriously the quantitative aspect of the results obtained in this study’. They then go on to state that their aim was to understand the processes involved, and in that aim they had some success. Their warning against taking quantitative model outputs too seriously still stands today, although our understanding of the climate system has increased significantly in the 35 years since that warning was issued, and models have played a role in advancing that understanding.

One can still argue that our climate models are more useful in increasing our understanding and insight than providing detailed numbers suitable for forward planning; this argument becomes stronger in the second half of this century and beyond. Scientific understanding of the mechanisms of the climate system and their likely responses reinforce the view that the risks are significant and that a delay in action can be very costly.

[…]

Given that (i) model diversity need not constrain (anyone’s) sub jective probability of events in the world, (ii) climate simulations hold a high- profile position relative to the foundational climate science, and (iii) today’s models are not empirically adequate even in simulating today’s climate, the drive to extract precise probability projections of very high spatial resolution (http://ukclimatepro jections.defra.gov.uk/content/view/868/531/) might be found surprising. The astonishing success of computer simulation at providing useful, if far from perfect, probability forecasts for weather phenomena is reminiscent of how the Newtonian framework first advanced and later retarded the advance of scientific understanding.

Whitehead [44] referred to the mis-identification of model-based entities with their real-world counterparts as the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, writing: ‘The advantage of confining attention to a definite group of abstractions is that you confine your thoughts to clear-cut definite things, with clear-cut definite relations. …The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group of abstractions, however well-founded, is that, by the nature of the case, you have abstracted from the remainder of things. …Sometimes it happens that the service rendered by philosophy is entirely obscured by the astonishing success of a scheme of abstractions in expressing the dominant interests of an epoch’.

Computer simulations have achieved astonishing success in weather forecasting. Advances in computational graphic arts and statistical post-processing can create an attractive picture from simulations of an empirically inadequate model. Arguably, the policy-relevant aim of today’s climate simulation is neither numbers nor pictures but insight. To interpret model-based probabilities for climate at the end of this century as reflecting some aspect of the world is to commit Whitehead’s fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

[…]

7. Improving the support science provides climate policy-making

Communication is most effective when scientists carefully consider the processes and levers of policy-making. Without careful communication, policy-makers do not know how to use what they are hearing. Communicating all varieties of uncertainty allows policy-makers to more easily hear early warnings for initiating policy action and more confidently ignore late excuses for delaying action further still. The case against action has to successfully argue that the risks are small, not merely that the outcomes are uncertain. Engaging with the policy process and communicating the current level (and limits) of scientific understanding will lead to more effective policy-making than merely providing clear statements of state of the science in terms familiar to the scientists themselves.

Along with other policy targets which persist for decades if not centuries, the need for scientific support for climate policy will be with us on time scales longer than the professional career of any particular scientist. How do we better stimulate and harvest advances in deep and difficult research questions while maintaining foundational work advancing our understanding of the phenomena [45]? How can we maintain and enhance the ways in which science handles uncertainty in all its forms, so as to improve the support science offers to climate policy-makers? Significant engagement with these questions lies beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, there is some value in opening a discussion of these and related questions.

Even as simulations improve, the need to evaluate ambiguity and intractability implies a need for scientific understanding of the Earth System that surpasses the ability to build (a component of) a good simulation. A level of understanding of the entire physical system is of value here: understanding that allows both insight into the system itself and recognition of the limits of state-of-the-art simulations.

Current incentives in science tend to drive the rising generation of young scientists towards specialization. How would the guidance we offer our graduate students change (or the content of our lecture courses), if the aim were to improve the state of climate science in 2030, rather than to secure them a career path in 3 years’ time? Since scientists are human beings, the policy relevance of their work, its limitations and its oversell are affected by incentives on the table.

Current incentives for research programmes are not tuned to benefit policy support in the long run. A solid piece of important mathematics or physical analysis that advances our understanding, but is of little immediate practical value, may prove of less value in securing a research position than the development and first implementation of some parametrization scheme for some ‘penguin effect’-like phenomenon.* Do current incentives focus researchers appropriately on the foundational work which will prove of most value to policy-makers in the long run?

=============
* The penguin effect occurs when penguins, which have black backs and white bellies, react to the local warming and roll over, altering the Earth’s albedo. The effect is apocryphal, and were it to exist current models do not realistically simulate the conditions that would drive it. Nevertheless, were a young researcher to implement this effect in one state-of-the-art climate model, he or she would be all but assured employment doing the same at a competing institution.
=============

[…]

Arguably, science aims at understanding the phenomena, ideally banishing ambiguity to a negligible role and reducing prediction to the propagation of current imprecision into the future. To oversimplify: advances in pure science reduce ambiguity and clarify questions of intractability, while advances in applied science and simulation increase the relevance of our conditional probabilities for decision-making by quantifying imprecision better. Policy support with regard to long-lived phenomena like climate change will be less effective if either area is neglected.

8. Concluding remarks

Sound policy-making embraces the causal chain connecting actions by people to impacts on people. Many varieties of uncertainty are encountered along this chain, including: imprecision, ambiguity, intractability and indeterminacy. Science regularly handles the first with probability theory; ambiguity and intractability are more often used by scientists to guide the advancement of science rather than being handled within science explicitly [45]. A better understanding by scientists of the roles of uncertainty within policy-making may improve the support science offers policy-making. In particular, an improved understanding of which scientific uncertainties pose the greatest challenges to policy-making when projected along the entire causal chain considered by policy, and informed scientific speculation on the likelihood of reducing those specific uncertainties in the near future, would be of immediate value. Some of these roles have been illustrated in the context of a particular example: selecting a stabilization target for greenhouse gas concentration.

Handling ambiguity in science, and the communication of insights from science, has been discussed. The value of scientific insight to policy-making, particularly in cases where state-of-the-art models are not empirically adequate, is stressed. Specifying the robustness of insights, and ideally quantifying how quickly model simulations are likely to become mis-informative as one moves further into the future, are each of significant value to sound policy-making.

No scientific extrapolation is complete without a quantitative estimate of the chance of its own irrelevance. Communicating to policy-makers the level of confidence scientists have that their model-based probabilities are not mis-informative is at least as important as communicating the model-based probabilities themselves. Engagement of scientists in the policy-making process, not merely by presenting the outputs of models but by explaining the insights from science, can significantly improve the formation of policy. This is especially true in climate policy, where the scale of the risk is great even if we cannot provide precise probabilities of specific events, and where many plausible changes are effectively irreversible should they occur.

Scientists who merely communicate results within the comfortable area of reliable theory abandon the decision stage to those who often have little engagement with the science. Sound policy-making is then hindered by the lack of sound scientific speculation on high-impact events, which we cannot currently model but may plausibly experience. Failing to engage with the question ‘What might a 6 °C warmer world look like, if it were to occur?’ leaves only naive answers on the table for policy-makers to work with.

Complementary to the need for scientific engagement with the policy process is the need for more transparent communication of the limits of current models when presenting model output. Policy-makers are often told that the models ‘have improved’ and that representations of more phenomena ‘have been introduced’. Clear statements of the spatial and temporal scales at which model output is ‘likely’ to be mis-informative, and how these change between 2020, 2050, 2090 and so on, would be of great value in interpreting when the model output is useful for a particular policy purpose. Honesty here enhances credibility and thus effectiveness.

Even when technically coherent, failing to lay the limits of today’s insights in plain view, as with the presentation of ‘temperature anomalies’ in summaries for policy-makers [26], hinders communication of large systematic model errors in today’s models, and hence the relevant level of ambiguity. The eventual realization that such figures show weaker evidence than originally thought can be blown dangerously out of proportion by the anti-science lobby, making the use of science in support of policy-making more difficult than it need be. Again, greater engagement of scientists in the policy process, openly explaining the insights of today’s science and limitations of today’s models, is a significant benefit. This may prove especially true in situations where decisions are based upon feelings as much as upon numbers [46].

[…]

References

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